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REVISITING EQUITY JURISPRUDENCE IN A 
COMPARATIVE CONTEXT: LEARNING FROM 
INDIA’S INTERPRETATIVE FRAMEWORK  
SUJATA GADKAR-WILCOX

 
ABSTRACT 
The recent case of Floyd, et al. v. City of New York, et al., raises 
important questions about the nature and function of judicial equity 
power. In August 2013, the Honorable Shira Scheindlin ruled that the New 
York Police Department systematically violated the United States 
Constitution by engaging in racially discriminatory stop and frisk 
practices. Accordingly, the court ordered a series of very extensive 
equitable remedies to address the discriminatory practice, including the 
appointment of an independent monitor; a specific performance order 
mandating immediate reforms to stop and frisk practices; a joint remedy 
and mediation process involving community stakeholders; and an NYPD 
pilot program implementing the utilization of body-worn cameras by 
patrol officers. The decision reopened the debate regarding the scope and 
reach of equity jurisprudence. In the United States, the equity debate has 
been subject to opposing schools of thought centering on the doctrine of 
expansive equity and the proper role of remedial power in contemporary 
legal jurisprudence. When we turn our attention to jurisdictions struggling 
with similar tensions between the rule of law and the need to remedy 
systemic inequality, we gain some useful insight into the role of differing 
epistemological frameworks in creating alternative methods of finding the 
proper balance. A comparison to the Indian context is particularly useful 
given the intentionality with which the Supreme Court of India has 
expanded the equity power to remedy social injustice. The Supreme Court 
of India has actively expanded its equity jurisprudence to creatively 
adjudicate and elaborate on fundamental rights. The Supreme Court of 
India has rejected mechanical rule-bound adjudications, viewing them as 
a way for judges to insulate themselves from accountability for their 
decisions and from the social impact of those choices, broadly interpreting 
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equity jurisprudence. A comparative analysis of equity jurisprudence 
underscores the importance of interpretation in the construction of legal 
jurisprudence. While the U.S. Supreme Court’s analysis operates largely 
within a positivist framework, the activism of the Supreme Court of India 
resonates with feminist legal analysis by prioritizing lived experience over 
objective abstractions. In other words, the Supreme Court of India frames 
legal questions in a way that emphasizes the individual and recognizes 
that judges may use appropriate discretion in crafting equitable remedies 
for those who face systemic vulnerabilities. Thus, comparative legal 
analysis offers us pathways to reassess our interpretive priorities.  
INTRODUCTION 
On August 12, 2013, United States District Court Judge for the 
Southern District of New York, the Honorable Shira A. Scheindlin, held 
that the City of New York violated the Fourth and Fourteenth 
Amendments of the United States Constitution by promulgating a “stop 
and frisk” policy that had a disparate impact on racial minorities.1 
Moreover, the court held that “senior officials in the City and the NYPD 
were deliberately indifferent” about the effects of this policy, and that 
these unconstitutional effects were “sufficiently widespread that they had 
the force of law.”2  
Though this opinion was the subject of considerable press coverage, 
equally notable was Judge Scheindlin’s opinion on the extensive remedies 
required to address these violations—a remedy that combined the 
violations found in the Floyd case with those found in the related Ligon 
case, which declared that an NYPD policy of frisking, questioning, and in 
some cases arresting people for trespass outside of certain public buildings 
violated the Fourth Amendment.
3
 Judge Scheindlin ordered the 
appointment of a monitor to oversee reforms of the NYPD and conduct 
compliance reviews and a facilitator to help ensure that these reforms were 
carried out;
4
 the revision of training manuals to eliminate racial profiling 
and other constitutionally impermissible language;
5
 the description of all 
stops by police in their activity logs;
6
 the increase of supervision, 
 
 
 1. Floyd v. City of New York, 959 F. Supp. 2d 540, 658 (S.D.N.Y. 2013). 
 2. Id. 
 3. Id. 
 4. Id. at 677–78.  
 5. Id. at 680. 
 6. Id. at 682–83. 
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monitoring, and discipline of officers involved in stop and frisk activity; 
the more effective communication of this requirement to the officers ;
7
 the 
requirement that officers wear body cameras to monitor their activity;
8
 
and, perhaps most significantly, the implementation of a “joint remedial 
process” under which members of the NYPD would meet with a number 
of interested community organizations and hold town hall meetings with 
citizens in the effected areas to try to facilitate community healing.
9
 
The breadth of Judge Scheindlin’s findings and her remedies were the 
subject of nearly immediate debate, both in the popular press and among 
legal scholars.
10
 The sweep of the decision, Lawrence Rosenthal claimed, 
imposed such a burden that it essentially created a “federal judge-run 
NYPD” that would simply keep police officers from enforcing the law at 
all, forcing them to “stay in the doughnut shops.”11 The controversy 
continued in October 2013 when a three-judge panel of the United States 
Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit stayed Judge Scheindlin’s order.12 
The panel found that Judge Scheindlin, in statements pertaining to a 
related matter, had “run afoul” of two of the canons of the Code of 
Conduct for United States Judges by improperly encouraging the plaintiffs 
to initiate a lawsuit and by improperly defending herself in the media in 
response to the intense scrutiny that accompanied her rulings.
13
  
By 2014, due to a change in political circumstances, the controversy 
over the Ligon and Floyd cases had largely subsided. Under the leadership 
of a new mayor, Bill de Blasio, the City of New York indicated an interest 
in shelving the appeals and settling the lawsuits over the stop-and-frisk 
policy.
14
 On January 30, 2014, the Acting Corporation Counsel of the City 
of New York, Jeffrey Friedlander, filed a motion to partially remand the 
case back to the District Court for this purpose, and on February 21, 2014, 
 
 
 7. Id. at 683–84. 
 8. Id. at 685. 
 9. Id. at 686. 
 10. E.g., Joseph Goldstein, Judge Rejects New York’s Stop-and-Frisk Policy, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 
13, 2013, at A1; Tom Howell Jr., NYC Mayor Bloomberg Staunchly Defends Stop-and-Frisk Program, 
WASH. TIMES, Aug. 12, 2013; David Rudovsky, Debate: The Constitutionality of Stop-and-Frisk in 
New York City, 162 U. PA. L. REV. ONLINE 117 (2013). 
 11. Rudovsky, supra note 10, at 135. 
 12. Ligon v. City of New York, 2012 WL 2125989 (S.D.N.Y. 2012). 
 13. In re Reassignment of Cases: Ligon; Floyd et al. v. City of New York et al. 13-3123; 13-3088 
(S.D.N.Y. 2013), available at https://ccrjustice.org/sites/default/files/assets/2nd%20Cir%20Panel’s 
%2011%2013%202013%20Opinion%20Explaining%2010%2031%202013%20Order%20Removing
%20Judge%20Scheindlin.pdf 
 14. Zachary R. Dowdy, NYC Stop-and-Frisk Cases Back in District Court, NEWSDAY, Feb. 21, 
2014; see also Emily Chiang, Reviving the Declaratory Judgment: A New Path to Structural Reform, 
63 BUFF. L. REV. 549, 605–06 (noting that DeBlasio’s election rendered stop-and-frisk moot). 
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the Second Circuit Court of Appeals agreed, releasing the stay and 
remanding the case back to the District Court.
15
 On April 3, 2014, the City 
of New York and the plaintiffs in the Floyd and Ligon cases came to the 
mutual agreement that Judge Scheindlin’s Remedial Order would be 
accepted so long as the Court-appointed monitor could be appointed for a 
limited three-year term, rather than serving indefinitely until all violations 
had ceased, as was called for in Judge Scheindlin’s original order.16 On 
July 30, 2014, Judge Analisa Torres, who had been randomly selected by 
the Second Circuit to replace the removed Judge Scheindlin, denied a 
motion to intervene to stop the settlement between the city and the 
plaintiffs from going forward, a motion that was filed on behalf of the 
New York City Police Unions. Judge Torres found that the Police Union 
lacked standing and that their motion was not timely.
17
 
Though the Ligon and Floyd cases may have fallen out of the 
headlines, the months of intense scrutiny served to highlight the debate on 
the role of equitable remedies and the nature and limits of the power of the 
federal courts. In the United States, this debate has centered on the depth 
and scope of the remedial powers within the historical and contemporary 
understandings of equity jurisprudence.
18
 The jurisdiction conferred on the 
federal courts to entertain suits in equity is derived from the English Court 
of Chancery and associated with “higher notions of justice and the 
chancellor’s conscience.”19 Both historical and contemporary 
 
 
 15. Declaration in Support of Motion for Limited Remand to the District Court for the Purpose of 
Exploring a Resolution at 1, Ligon v. City of New York, 743 F.3d 362 (2d Cir. 2014) (No. 13-03442); 
Ligon v. City of New York, 743 F.3d 362, 364 (2d Cir. 2014). 
 16. Memorandum of Law in Support of Motion for Modification of Remedial Order at 1, Floyd 
v. City of New York, 959 F. Supp. 2d 668 (S.D.N.Y 2013) (No. 1:08-cv-01034), available at 
https://ccrjustice.org/sites/default/files/assets/4-3-14%20Floyd%20-%20Joint%20Mem%20of%20 Law 
.pdf. 
 17. Floyd v. City of New York, No. 08 Civ. 1034 (AT), 2 (S.D.N.Y. 2014), available at 
https://ccrjustice.org/sites/default/files/assets/Floyd%20v%20City%20of%20New%20York%20-%20 
July%2030%202014%20Opinion%20and%20Order.pdf. 
 18. Martha S. Berzon, Madison Lecture: Securing Fragile Foundations: Affirmative 
Constitutional Adjudication in Federal Courts, 84 N.Y.U. L. REV. 681, 718 (2009) (arguing that the 
judiciary should have the power to decide appropriate remedies in constitutional cases, but should 
exercise this power carefully); Missouri v. Jenkins, 515 U Günter Frankenberg, Stranger than 
Paradise: Identity & Politics of Comparative Law, 1997 UTAH L. REV. 259, 265 (1997); John Choon 
Yoo, Who Measures the Chancellor’s Foot? The Inherent Remedial Authority of Federal Courts, 84 
CALIF. L. REV. 1121, 1123 (1996) (arguing that broad remedial powers are not in keeping with the 
principle of judicial restraint and violate Article III of the U.S. Constitution); Frank Askin, Two 
Visions of Justice: Federal Courts at the Crossroads, 11 ST. JOHN’S J. C.R. & ECON. DEV. 1, 4–5 
(1995) (criticizing conservative arguments against equity power as misunderstanding the historical 
development of remedial powers). 
 19. Kristin Collins, “A Considerable Surgical Operation”: Article III, Equity, and Judge-made 
Law in the Federal Courts, 60 DUKE L.J. 249, 266 (2010).  
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_globalstudies/vol15/iss2/7
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understandings of federal equity jurisprudence refer to “a set of rights, 
remedies, and procedures available ostensibly to ameliorate defects of the 
common law.”20 Equitable remedies were not traditionally available if 
there were an adequate remedy at law. However, remedies such as specific 
performance, injunctions, and accountings filled the gaps for which 
substantive common law failed to account.
21
 
In connection with the redress of policies of discrimination, the 
contemporary debate on equity power is connected to a long history of 
efforts by the U.S. Supreme Court to enforce its desegregation rulings. 
Moreover, the limits and extent of the remedial power continue to be 
issues that divide the Court. On the one hand, federal equity powers are 
claimed to be jurisdictional powers that are limited “to those which would 
remedy a constitutional violation—nothing further.”22 On the other hand, 
they have also been held to “reflect equitable common sense.”23 While the 
debate continues, the trend is clear: the Supreme Court of the United 
States (“U.S. Supreme Court”) has gradually restricted the use of equity 
powers to redress racial discrimination since the zenith of their use in the 
1960s and 1970s. While the federal courts, pursuant to a more expansive 
approach to equitable remedies, may have crafted extensive and 
interventionist remedies, they were ultimately applied to an institutional 
practice that was narrow in scope. The Court used equity power to either 
end the de jure aspects of a constitutional violation or to restore the 
members of a class to the same position they would have held absent the 
constitutional violation.
24
 When looking at recent majority opinions on 
equitable remedies, “one could reasonably conclude” that expansive 
federal equity power “has ceased to exist.”25 Regardless of the scope of 
equitable powers in United States jurisprudence, one thing remains clear: 
the general trend and permissible use of the U.S. Supreme Court’s equity 
power has been understood to be limited to individualistic and aberrant 
transgressions, often carried out by the state, as a solution to the resulting 
inequity. This epistemological position does not account for the broader 
 
 
 20. Id. 
 21. Richard Maloy, Expansive Equity Jurisprudence: A Court Divided, 40 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 
641, 642 (2007) (quoting Stephen N. Subrin, How Equity Conquered Common Law: The Federal 
Rules of Civil Procedure in Historical Perspective, 135 U. PA. L. REV. 909, 920 (1987)); Askin, supra 
note 18, at 7–9 (discussing the need for broad remedial equity powers to enforce basic constitutional 
rights). 
 22. Maloy, supra note 21, at 643. 
 23. Id. at 645. 
 24. See Yoo, supra note 18, at 1127. 
 25. Maloy, supra note 21, at 642.  
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systemic and societal components constitutive of an underlying structural 
inequality. 
When the U.S. Supreme Court’s hesitance to use equity power is 
examined in comparative perspective, its resistance contrasts markedly 
with the liberal use of the equity power in other countries. This paper 
argues that the Supreme Court of India’s generally more aggressive use of 
equity powers than the U.S. Supreme Court reflects its different historical 
and epistemological framework, which has allowed the Supreme Court of 
India to address systemic issues by implementing equity jurisprudence in 
an intentional and determined fashion. I contend that the main cause of the 
Supreme Court of India’s willingness, even eagerness, to use equity 
powers, and of the U.S. Supreme Court’s increasing hesitance to do so, 
lies not just in different constitutional structures or even in their different 
historical experiences, but rather in fundamental differences in 
epistemology and interpretation. In other words, these courts have 
different views about what the fundamental role of courts is in their 
respective societies. They also differ in their methods for adjudicating 
cases. The United States tends to subsume particular facts of cases of 
widespread discrimination and injustice into prefigured, abstract 
normative interpretations, in a way that rationalizes the injustice by 
elevating it to a level of formal theory, which insulates the court from 
accountability for the practical effects of their decisions.
26
 On the other 
hand, the Supreme Court of India tends to reject this mechanistic 
application of broad legal principles to each case, instead attempting to fit 
remedies to the particular situations arising among individuals, reflecting 
their view that the Constitution of India “contains a positive grant of 
power to the government to take steps to eliminate inequality.”27 Because 
of this, the Supreme Court of India has embraced equity jurisprudence, so 
that “some of the most forward-looking reforms of the recent era emanated 
from the Supreme Court rather than the national or state legislatures.”28 
Fundamentally, these observations demonstrate that comparative legal 
 
 
 26. Pierre Schlag, Normative and Nowhere to Go, 43 STAN. L. REV. 167, 177–78 (1990); Richard 
Delgado, Shadowboxing: An Essay on Power, 77 CORNELL L. REV. 813, 820 (1992). 
 27. Eileen Kaufman, Women and Law: A Comparative Analysis of the United States and Indian 
Supreme Courts’ Equality Jurisprudence, 34 GA. J. INT’L & COMP. L. 558, 617 (2006) (arguing that in 
the context of sex discrimination and violence against women, the Supreme Court of India is willing to 
consider activist remedies for gender inequality). See also S. P. Sathe, Judicial Activism: The Indian 
Experience, 6 WASH. U. J.L. & POL’Y 29 (2001) (arguing that the Supreme Court of India’s activism 
should be understood in the context of the Indian political and cultural history). 
 28. Daniel Aguilar, Groundwater Reform in India: An Equity and Sustainability Issue, 46 TEX. 
INT’L L.J. 623, 631 (2011) (commenting on the breadth of equity jurisprudence in environmental and 
groundwater contexts). 
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analysis needs to consider epistemological positions, social attitudes, 
cultural norms, and historical contexts in making comparisons rather than 
relying on textual interpretation alone. This principle holds especially true 
when the object of comparison itself is the judicial remedy established to 
address pervasive and entrenched social problems, as is the case with 
equitable remedy jurisprudence. 
I. CRITICAL COMPARISON AND THE CASE FOR MULTI-PERSPECTIVAL 
EPISTEMOLOGY 
While the U.S. Supreme Court’s analysis operates largely within a 
positivist framework, the activism of the Supreme Court of India resonates 
with feminist legal analysis by prioritizing lived experience over objective 
abstractions.
29
 In other words, when the Supreme Court of India frames 
legal questions in a way that emphasizes the circumstances of each 
individual case, they recognize that judges may use appropriate discretion 
in crafting equitable remedies for those who face systemic vulnerabilities.  
Although there is neither a universal nor a clearly demarcated 
dichotomy between the two systems, since both at times operate within a 
positivist framework, and since individual judges at times employ 
remedies that may not fit squarely within a broader legal trajectory (as 
seen in the Floyd decision), analyzing the epistemological approaches that 
the Supreme Courts in both India and the United States have at times taken 
with regard to equitable remedies provides a useful comparative 
perspective on the constitutional jurisprudence of both traditions. Because 
epistemology shapes the rationale and justification that courts provide for 
their remedial power, a comparative legal analysis offers us pathways to 
reassess our interpretive priorities.
30
 While the contours and autonomy of 
 
 
 29. For a discussion of feminist legal methods, see Katherine Bartlett, Feminist Legal Methods, 
103 HARV. L. REV. 829. On the application of feminist legal methods and other social criticisms into 
normative jurisprudence, see Balakrishnan Rajagopal, International Law and Social Movements: 
Challenges of Theorizing Resistance, 41 COLUM J. TRANSNAT’L L. 397, 403–04 (2003) (arguing that 
that critical race theorists and feminists in the United States and transnational and comparative social 
theorists of law in Europe share criticisms of the “technocratic-rational model of law”). 
 30. Dana Raigrodski, What Can Comparative Legal Studies Learn from Feminist Legal Theories 
in the Era of Globalization, 43 U. BALTIMORE L. REV. 349, 382 (2014) (arguing that an epistemology 
of objectivity should be replaced with a “concrete, experience-based, multi-perspectival 
epistemology”); Ann Scales, The Emergence of Feminist Jurisprudence, 95 YALE L.J. 1373, 1402 
(1986) (suggesting that legal objectivity is flawed insofar as it applies “the tried and true scientific 
strategy of treating non-conforming evidence as mistaken,” but that this dilemma can be overcome 
without resorting to a nihilistic rejection of reliable principles of law); Eric Engle, Knight’s Gambit to 
Fool’s Mate: Beyond Legal Realism, 41 VAL. U. L. REV. 1633, 1682–83 (2007) (suggesting that the 
Washington University Open Scholarship
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comparative law continue to be debated,
31
 “[u]nderstanding is one of 
comparative law’s main purposes.”32 Comparative scholarship attempts to 
understand the nature of law and legal change in varying contexts.
33
 
Comparative law offers a new dimension from which one can learn 
distinct jurisprudential approaches to common legal problems and 
reconsider their own methodological approach as applied in a local 
context.
34
 Mary Ann Glendon suggests that a significant contribution of 
comparativist work is the ability to navigate between local and universal 
principles. “Indeed, the comparativists skill in mediating between the 
universal and the particular” may be the greatest service they can offer to 
legal discourse and pedagogy.
35
 Comparative law “has the paradoxical 
capacity to deepen our understanding and appreciation of the 
particularities of legal traditions while at the same time helping us 
transcend their differences by relating them to one another.”36  
Comparative law can help debunk the myth that reason can help us 
derive universally applicable rules by presenting legal traditions, including 
universalized discourses such as international human rights law, as simply 
one of many options in a continuum of legal choices rather than an a 
contextual set of norms.
37
 Pierre Legrand has noted that all law is a 
 
 
failure of both legal realism and critical legal studies has been an inability to develop a new 
epistemology that does not rely on dualism or on philosophical idealism).  
 31. See David Kennedy, The Methods and the Politics, in COMPARATIVE LEGAL STUDIES: 
TRADITIONS AND TRANSITIONS 345, 347–48 (Pierre LeGrande & Rodderick Mundy eds., 2003) 
(arguing that practitioners of Comparative Law have struggled to define it in the absence of a clear 
political project); Mathias Reimann, The End of Comparative Law as an Autonomous Subject, 11 TUL. 
EUR. & CIV. L.F. 49, 54 (1996) (arguing that is difficult to identify the purported goal of comparative 
law “because it claims to be about a plethora of different things at the same time”). 
 32. Hiram Chodosh, Comparing Comparisons: In Search of Methodology, 84 IOWA L. REV. 
1025, 1070 (1999). See also MARY ANN GLENDON, RIGHTS TALK: THE IMPOVERISHMENT OF 
POLITICAL DISCOURSE 170 (1991) (arguing that the insularity from global perspectives on issues such 
as fundamental rights prevents one from learning from the successes and failures of others). 
 33. Chodosh, supra note 32. 
 34. Jaakko Husa, Turning the Curriculum Upside Down: Comparative Law as an Educational 
Tool for Constructing the Pluralistic Legal Mind, 10 GERMAN L.J. 913, 915 (2009) (citing KONRAD 
ZWEIGERT & HEIN KÖTZ, AN INTRODUCTION TO COMPARATIVE LAW (3d ed. 1998)). 
 35. Mary Ann Glendon, Comparative Law in the Age of Globalization, 52 DUQ. L. REV. 1, 24 
(2014). 
 36. Paolo Carozza, Uses and Misuses of Comparative Law in International Human Rights: Some 
Reflections on the Jurisprudence of the European Court of Human Rights, 73 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 
1217, 1236 (1998) (discussing the application of comparative analysis in the human rights 
jurisprudence of the European Court of Human Rights). 
 37. Id.; see also Paolo D. Carozza, Continuity and Rupture in “New Approaches to Comparative 
Law”, 1997 UTAH L. REV. 657, 663 (1997) (suggesting that even in more traditional conceptions of 
comparative law, “the value of comparative methods has always been in forcing us into sympathetic 
yet critical knowledge of law in another context, thereby disrupting our settled understandings, 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_globalstudies/vol15/iss2/7
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“cultural phenomenon.” If this were the case, as Legrand argues, then the 
job of comparativists is not just to comprehend the laws in question but to 
understand “the historical, social, economic, political, cultural, and 
psychological context,” which has made legal propositions what they are.38 
The field of comparative law has already moved beyond rudimentary 
understandings of differential systems. In particular, comparative 
jurisprudence “has learned to look beyond a notion of legal systems as 
static and isolated entities” and to recognize the constitutive nature of legal 
practice and local culture.
39
 
However, comparative legal scholars always run the risk of 
essentializing culturally embedded prescriptive rules under a veil of 
neutrality.
40
 Consequently, critical comparativists see comparative law as 
entrenched in false dichotomies that are perceived to be objective.
41
 
Comparisons between the common and civil law tradition, self and other, 
or Western and non-Western approaches, essentialize classifications that 
are simply constructs of legal discourse.
42
 Comparisons between laws tend 
to presume that language is transparent and is not altered when placed in a 
different sociocultural context. They fail, therefore, to “treat rules as 
actively constituted through the life of interpretive communities.”43 
Instead, a more useful and productive comparative methodology requires 
an abandonment of essentialist claims of authenticity in favor of a 
recognition of alternative approaches to legal interpretation and decision-
making.
44
 Rather than entrenching constructed taxonomies, the goal of 
 
 
provoking us to new judgments, and demanding our response with new decisions, commitments, and 
actions.”). 
 38. Pierre Legrand, How to Compare Now, 16 LEGAL STUD. 232, 236 (1996). Legrand ultimately 
believes that these differences in cultural norms make laws incommensurable and impervious to 
comparison, leading his method of comparative law to be more like a methodology of contrastive law. 
Oliver Brand, Conceptual Comparisons: Towards a Coherent Methodology of Comparative Legal 
Studies, 32 BROOKLYN J. INT’L L. 405, 431 (2007). Nevertheless, his work points to the capacities of 
comparativists to move beyond the “shortcomings of functionalist studies.” Id. at 432. 
 39. Mathias Reimann, The Progress and Failure of Comparative Law in the Second Half of the 
Twentieth Century, 50 AM. J. COMP. L. 671, 677–78 (2002). 
 40. Günter Frankenberg, Critical Comparisons: Re-thinking Comparative Law, 26 HARV. INT’L 
L.J. 411 (1985) (criticizing “comparative legal scholarship’s faith in an objectivity that allows 
culturally biased perspectives to be represented as ‘neutral.’”). 
 41. Omri Marian, The Discursive Failure in Comparative Tax Law, 56 AM. J. COMP. L. 415, 435 
(2010). 
 42. Id at 436. 
 43. Pierre Legrand, What Legal Transplants?, in 7 ADAPTING LEGAL CULTURES 54 (David 
Nelkin and Johannes Feast eds, 2001). 
 44. Günter Frankenberg, Stranger than Paradise: Identity & Politics of Comparative Law, 1997 
UTAH L. REV. 259, 265 (1997) (suggesting that traditional approaches to international law are 
paternalistic and “as much about authority and politics” as they are about intellectual pursuit); 
Carozza, supra note 37, at 663 (suggesting that even in more traditional conceptions of comparative 
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critical comparison is to expose the aporias of mainstream comparative 
law and to “suggest alternative discursive agendas.”45 In providing a more 
useful comparative methodology, Gunter Frankenberg identifies discursive 
revelations and transformations as the key to understanding different legal 
systems. In particular, Frankenberg suggests a three-tiered approach to 
comparative methodology. First, one must reflect upon the legal and non-
legal (social, political, psychological, moral) dimensions of a particular 
jurisprudence and conceptualize the ways in which it has been fitted into a 
given legal framework. Second, critical comparison must deconstruct the 
process of legal decision making by extracting from beneath the claims of 
legal rationality competing political visions and contradictory norms. 
Finally, one must “re-introduce what the legal discourse” has ignored or 
marginalized.
46
 Frankenberg describes the rhetorical practice of self-
critically reflecting, deconstructing and reorienting discourse as the most 
useful methodology for comparative analysis.
47
 The central tenet of such 
an interpretive model presumes an ability on the part of the author (and 
reader) to reconsider a particular epistemology. Frankenberg suggests that 
comparative scholars treat comparative analysis as a process of study 
whereby they can demystify the false dichotomies that a functionalist 
comparison presupposes and reconsider their own preconceptions about a 
given legal system.
48
 
Of course, one of the main limitations of comparative study is that, 
while it may critically compare specific aspects of a particular legal 
question, it often fails to challenge the epistemology of a dominant 
discourse.
49
 The danger in perpetuating artificial comparisons is the 
likelihood that such analysis simply perpetuates a hegemony of legal 
understanding and fails to get the reader, or the author, to the productive 
potential of critical comparison, which results from a reorientation of the 
underlying epistemology of a given legal discourse. In order to achieve the 
kind of transformative understanding that comparative analysis often 
seeks, one must be provided with the tools to reorient the preconceived 
 
 
law, “the value of comparative methods has always been in forcing us into sympathetic yet critical 
knowledge of law in another context, thereby disrupting our settled understandings, provoking us to 
new judgments, and demanding our response with new decisions, commitments, and actions.”). 
 45. Omri Y. Marian, Meaningless Comparisons: Corporate Tax Reform Discourse in the United 
States, 32 VA. TAX REV. 133, 140 (2012).  
  46. Günter Frankenberg, Critical Comparisons: Re-thinking Comparative Law, 26 HARV. INT’L. 
L. J. 411, 452 (1985). 
 47.  Id. at 441–43. 
 48. Brand, supra note 38, at 433. 
 49. Husa, supra note 34, at 918 (“Grand theories of comparative legal science or comparative 
legal studies do not change the prior epistemic embedding that has already taken place.”). 
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legal narratives that are rooted in a particular epistemology.
50
 The 
revelation of an underlying discursive structure provides individuals with 
the ability to recognize and thereby reorient entrenched presumptions.
51
 
The value of comparative analysis, therefore, is derived not only from the 
implementation of a relative metric for assessing two or more disparate 
systems, but also from the interpretative ability of a critical and disruptive 
linguistic analysis to reveal textual aporias and grapple with alternative 
approaches to jurisprudence.
52
 Ultimately, the process of engaging with 
alternative methodologies is itself useful in getting one to peer beyond 
their own underlying epistemological assumptions.
53
  
 
 
 50. Cf. id. at 922 (explaining that a constructivist approach to education enables students to 
reorient their own understanding of legal principles by providing them with the tools to select and 
transform information).  
 51. See MICHEL FOUCAULT, POWER/KNOWLEDGE: SELECTED INTERVIEWS AND OTHER 
WRITINGS 1972–1977 122–23 (Colin Gordon eds., Colin Gordon et al. trans., 1980); Michel Foucault, 
Human Nature: Justice versus Power, CHOMSKY.INFO, http://www.chomsky.info/debates/ 
1971xxxx.htm (last visited Oct. 12, 2015) (“It seems to me that the real political task in a society such 
as ours is to criticize the workings of institutions, which appear to be both neutral and independent; to 
criticize and attack them in such a manner that the political violence which has always exercised itself 
obscurely through them will be unmasked, so that one can fight against them. This critique and this 
fight seem essential to me for different reasons: firstly, because political power goes much deeper than 
one suspects; there are centers and invisible, little-known points of support; its true resistance, its true 
solidity is perhaps where one doesn’t expect it. Probably it’s insufficient to say that behind the 
governments, behind the apparatus of the State, there is the dominant class; one must locate the point 
of activity, the places and forms in which its domination is exercised. And because this domination is 
not simply the expression in political terms of economic exploitation, it is its instrument and, to a large 
extent, the condition which makes it possible; the suppression of the one is achieved through the 
exhaustive discernment of the other. Well, if one fails to recognize these points of support of class 
power, one risks allowing them to continue to exist; and to see this class power reconstitute itself even 
after an apparent revolutionary process”).  
 52. Fiona Sampson, Heidegger and the Aporia: Translation and Cultural Authenticity, 9 
CRITICAL REVIEW OF INTERNATIONAL SOCIAL AND POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY 527, 533 (2006) (arguing 
that in terms of language orientation, an indigenous encounter with an “other” unveils an aporia in that 
“threat posed by such Other-ness is its revelation that there is an alternative narrative as sustainable as 
one’s own. 
 53. BOAVENTURA DE SOUSA SANTOS, TOWARD A NEW LEGAL COMMON SENSE 237 (2002) 
(calling for a “new historical epistemology of need and difference”). It bears noting that the risk for 
any author making this claim is that they inevitably reproduce their own inquiry as an essentialized 
discourse. See Hiram Chodosh, Comparing Comparisons: In Search of Methodology, 84 IOWA L. REV. 
1025, 1104 (1999) (“Those who explicitly object to single feature theories often fall into the trap of 
employing them.”). However, the recognition of some potential bias in any method of inquiry itself 
provides some, even if limited, transparency in the end of the knowledge production, thereby allowing 
readers to assess the value of the alternative methodological means being discussed. Cf. GIORGIO 
AGAMBEN, STATE OF EXCEPTION 29–30 (Kevin Attell trans., 2008) (arguing that the state of 
exception, whereby legal rules are disrupted as a matter of oppressive governance, has become the 
norm in the contemporary politics, and requires a process of reorientation whereby the aporias of the 
domestic sphere and political sphere are deconstructed and reimagined through a politics of means that 
focuses on the process of open communication); JURGEN HABERMAS, THE THEORY OF 
COMMUNICATIVE ACTION VOLUME 2 1–4, 44–45, 390–392 (Thomas McCarthy trans., 1987) (arguing 
that communicative action is a process-oriented, means-based exercise, which can be distinguished 
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In the context of equitable remedies, in light of the decision in Floyd, 
the most important question may be: which interpretation best remedies 
the systemic vulnerabilities facing certain groups or classes of individuals 
and creates lasting social change in accordance with legal mandates? To 
answer this question, this article considers the ways in which the United 
States Supreme Court has limited equitable remedies for alleviating 
systematic discrimination. This article locates the turning point against the 
use of equitable powers in Milliken v. Bradley (1974)
54
 and traces the 
reasons for this decline to the United States Supreme Court’s increasing 
discomfort with being directly involved in major social transformations in 
such cases as Missouri v. Jenkins (1995).
55
 Next, it will contrast the 
Court’s reticence with the sweeping rulings of the Supreme Court of India 
in such cases as Maneka Gandhi v. Union of India (1978) and People’s 
Union for Civil Liberties v. Union of India (2001).
56
 It will then conclude 
by examining the historical orientation of both the United States and 
Indian Constitutions in order to demonstrate that the theoretical framework 
informing the process of constitutional drafting created varying 
epistemologies that served as the foundations for the equity jurisprudence 
constructed by their respective Supreme Courts. 
II. U.S. JURISPRUDENCE: THE LIMITS OF REMEDIAL MEASURES IN A 
POSITIVIST LEGAL MODEL 
The context in which the debate on equitable remedies is taking place 
demonstrates the limits of the positivist model in fashioning remedies 
necessary to address systemic violations of fundamental constitutional 
rights provisions. While scholars have discussed equitable powers as an 
aspirational goal, there has been less attention paid to the epistemological 
underpinnings of such an approach in the United States or in a 
comparative context. For example, Kent Roach, in distinguishing between 
the structural limitation inherent in a corrective theory of remedies and the 
transformative potential of equitable remedies, does not explain the 
Supreme Court’s general reluctance to employ equitable remedies in the 
broad and aspirational fashion he suggests. Moreover, his approach does 
not account for the Supreme Court’s more recent jurisprudence narrowing 
 
 
from the goal-orientation of other forms of action, such as instrumental action, and provides the ability 
to reflect upon language and its underlying propositional and normative claims). 
 54. Milliken v. Bradley, 418 U.S. 717 (1974). 
 55. See, e.g., Missouri v. Jenkins, 515 U.S. 70 (1995). 
 56. E.g., Maneka Gandhi v. Union of India, 1978 AIR 597, 1978 SCR (2) 621 (1978). 
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the scope of equity power by limiting it to specific constitutional 
violations.
57
 Though he cites certain instances in which the Supreme Court 
grapples with the notion of breaking away from the principle of corrective 
action, he notes that these instances do not “place enough weight on the 
interests of the plaintiffs,” and that the Court has generally paid “rhetorical 
adherence to corrective principles.”58 This remedial approach depends 
largely on a causal link between governmental conduct and the resulting 
harm, making it “difficult to justify remedies that respond to the needs of 
the plaintiffs and the opportunities for reform, but cannot be deduced from 
the violation of the constitutional rights at stake, or perhaps even 
expressed in the language of rights.”59 Both the U.S. Supreme Court’s 
reticence in employing extensive equitable measures and Justice Thomas’s 
claim that the framers of the Constitution did not intend for the Courts to 
have such broad jurisdiction require explanation. To analyze these, we 
must turn to jurisprudential and epistemological considerations, which can 
then be contrasted with alternative approaches that implement equitable 
remedies in the aspirational form suggested, and for the purpose of 
effecting extensive social reform. 
The U.S. Supreme Court’s decisions to limit equity power find their 
justification in positivism. Positivist legal theory is grounded in the 
possibility of “describing law as it is, while legal formalism presumes that 
there is an objective solution to legally-defined disputes.”60 In legal 
positivism, in other words, a norm is valid as a norm of that system solely 
by virtue of the fact that at some relevant time and place some relevant 
agent or agents announced it, practiced it, invoked it, enforced it, endorsed 
it, or otherwise engaged with it. It is no objection to its counting as a law 
 
 
 57. Kent Roach, The Limits of Corrective Justice and the Potential of Equity in Constitutional 
Remedies, 33 ARIZ. L. REV. 859 (1991); Missouri, 515 U.S. at 92–93 (noting that equitable remedy 
cannot go beyond constitutional violation it attempts to redress).  
 58. Roach, supra note 57, at 882–83. See also Paul Gertz, Choice in the Transition: School 
Desegregation and the Corrective Ideal, 86 COLUM. L. REV. 728, 729–32 (1986) (discussing the 
corrective aspiration of judicial remedies for violations of equal protection and remedies for unlawful 
school segregation, which narrowly furnish “remedies for identified acts of discrimination”).  
 59. Id. at 861. 
 60. Margaret Davies & Nan Seuffert, Knowledge, Identity, and the Politics of Law, 11 HASTINGS 
WOMEN’S L.J. 259, 266 (2000); Ernest J. Weinrib, Legal Formalism: On the Immanent Rationality of 
Law, 97 YALE L.J. 949, 955 (1987) (suggesting that legal formalism assumes a “rationality of law” 
which “lies in a moral order immanent to legal material” so that “formalism postulates that juridical 
content can somehow sustain itself from within”); Duncan Kennedy, Legal Formality, 2 J. LEGAL 
STUD. 351, 359 (1973) (suggesting that legal formality is a mechanical application of rules in which a 
judge “resolutely limits itself to those aspects of the situation which, per se, trigger his response”). 
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that it was an appalling norm that those agents should never have 
applied.
61
 
Thus, according to a positivist framework, legal norms are valid insofar 
as they refer to laws that have been implemented. A correlation to this 
observation is that laws have clearly interpretable meaning. Because the 
positivist model presupposes systemic validity, it fashions a remedy based 
on correcting procedural inadequacies. Such a model fails to account for 
the normative consequences of a social system in which inequalities are 
endemic and internalized.
62
 Moreover, legal formalism presumes that the 
process of legal decision-making eclipses any further normative 
considerations of the resulting rule. Both models presume that inequity 
results from irrationalities within the procedural structure of the legal 
system, rather than viewing the legal system as operating within larger 
systems of inequality. Instead of centering on the remedial practices 
necessary to ensure that plaintiff’s interests have been vindicated, the U.S. 
Supreme Court has limited its equity jurisprudence to an institutional 
responsibility to correct acts that resulted in the constitutional 
infringement.
63
 
The solution to a case of discrimination for positivists is to alter 
procedural guarantees provided by the legal system, not to alter the nature 
of the system itself.
64
 However, this model fails to account for the 
experience of vulnerability and further does not incorporate the remedial 
methods that use external social actors who either contribute to, or are 
constitutive of, the underlying structural inequality. Because the dominant 
understanding of remedies in American constitutional jurisprudence is that 
remedies are designed to correct a harm that the state or state actors have 
inflicted upon individuals, plaintiffs must generally establish a causal 
connection between the act and the resulting harm. “A sense of unease and 
 
 
 61. John Gardner, Legal Positivism: 5 ½ Myths, 46 AM. J. JURIS. 199, 200 (2001). 
 62. RICHARD DELGADO & JEAN STEFANCIC, CRITICAL RACE THEORY: AN INTRODUCTION 7 
(2001) (discussing the basic tenets of critical legal studies, including the notion that “racism is 
ordinary” and “difficult to cure or address”); Nicole Gonzalez, Van Cleve & Lauren Mayes, Criminal 
Justice through ‘Colorblind’ Lenses: A Call to Examine the Mutual Constitution of Race and Criminal 
Justice, 40 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 406, 412 (2015) (discussing how “colorblind ideology is 
institutionalized in the law through a narrowing legal definition of racism In the fields of international 
and comparative law, see Peter Halewood, Conceptualizing Violence: Present and Future 
Developments in International Law: Violence and the International Word, 60 ALB. L. REV. 565, 569 
(1997) (discussing critiques of legal positivism from the standpoint of feminist international legal 
theory and of critiques of statism). 
 63. Susan Poser, Termination of Desegregation Decrees and the Elusive Meaning of Unitary 
Status, 81 NEB. L. REV. 283, 323–24 (2002). 
 64. See Davies & Seuffert, supra note 60, at 266–67 (suggesting that “internal criticism” of the 
existing system is acceptable within legal formalism, while challenges to “legal objectivity” are not). 
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illegitimacy surrounds remedies which are not tailored to identified 
violations.”65 In the positivist model, a court’s willingness to act to remedy 
an inequity is based on their recognition that the procedure outlined to 
protect vulnerable groups has been improperly applied to a given 
context.
66
 However, pursuant to an alternative legal epistemology, such as 
that implemented by the Supreme Court of India, the court first recognizes 
that some act of injustice, often based on governmental policy, has created 
a particular kind of vulnerability and the experience of imbalance, for 
which it then fashions a remedy to address the inequality.
67
  
It is important to note that the epistemological approach taken by the 
Supreme Court of India can be distinguished from a broad interpretive 
approach sometimes taken by the U.S. Supreme Court.
68
 While broad 
constructionism in the United States certainly fashions a greater remedy 
beyond a narrow reading of a given constitutional provision, by 
accounting for the context and contemporary application of the 
fundamental constitutional principle, the epistemology does not go beyond 
the presumptions that limits the positivist model. In other words, even in a 
case like Brown v. Board of Education, in which the U.S. Supreme Court 
issued a second opinion regarding the appropriate remedial measures for 
school desegregation, the Court designed equitable remedies based on the 
presumption that the de jure segregation was an aberration of the equal 
protection doctrine and the root cause of the experience of inferiority. 
Accordingly, the legal remedy of non-discrimination policies presumed 
that the irrationalities of the system are based on an improper 
understanding of an otherwise available legal remedy, not that the system 
itself must be altered to address the impact of the constitutional violation.  
 
 
 65. Roach, supra note 57, at 898. 
 66. Kelly D. Hine, Comment: The Rule of Law Is Dead, Long Live the Rule: An Essay on Legal 
Rules, Equitable Standards, and the Debate Over Judicial Discretion, 50 SMU L. REV. 1769, 1779 
(arguing that positivism, formalism, realism, and moralism represent logically distinct elements in the 
development of equitable remedies). 
 67. Manoj Mate, The Rise of Judicial Governance in The Supreme Court of India, 33 B.U. INT’L 
L.J. 169, 180 (discussing the ways in which the Supreme Court of India “expanded the scope of its 
equitable and remedial power in a series of human rights cases that it decided during the late 1970s 
and early 1980s” and how public interest legislation was actively solicited by the court as part of this 
process). 
 68. See WHAT BROWN V. BOARD OF EDUCATION SHOULD HAVE SAID: THE NATION’S TOP 
LEGAL EXPERTS REWRITE AMERICA’S LANDMARK CIVIL RIGHTS DECISION 24 (Jack Balkin et al. eds., 
2002) (arguing that Brown I changed the kinds of arguments that constitutions and politicians could 
plausibly make). 
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III. THE GRADUAL NARROWING OF EQUITABLE REMEDIES BY THE UNITED 
STATES SUPREME COURT 
In 1954, the U.S. Supreme Court famously ruled in Brown v. Board of 
Education that “separate educational facilities are inherently unequal” and 
that segregating public school students by race was therefore a violation of 
the Fourteenth Amendment’s Equal Protection Clause.69 As a result of this 
decision, the U.S. Supreme Court needed to shape broad measures of 
equitable relief for desegregation, an issue that they took up in a 
reargument of the Brown case to determine remedial measures in 1955 
(popularly known as Brown II). In that decision, the U.S. Supreme Court 
explicated a clear philosophy in favor of producing active and localized 
remedial measures. Chief Justice Earl Warren, writing for the U.S. 
Supreme Court, made clear that “in fashioning and effectuating the 
decrees, the courts will be guided by equitable principles.”70 He therefore 
directed local courts of equity to make decisions to carry out desegregation 
that would be “characterized by a practical flexibility.”71 Depending on the 
particular local situation, Chief Justice Warren specified that the remedial 
measures could be quite extensive depending on the practical conditions 
involved, such as: problems related to administration, arising from the 
physical condition of the school plant, the school transportation system, 
personnel, revision of school districts and attendance areas into compact 
units to achieve a system of determining admission to the public schools, 
on a nonracial basis, and revision of local laws and regulations which may 
be necessary in solving the foregoing problems.
72
  
Fundamentally, the Warren Court’s remedies were premised on the 
notion that broad-based structural reforms to society would be necessary 
to uproot segregation by “root and branch” and that the Supreme Court 
would defer to district courts in crafting remedies that were appropriate to 
each specific situation.
73
 However, epistemologically, a review of Brown 
II reveals that the district court’s remedial power rested with the 
institutional dimensions of racial discrimination, including problems 
associated with school administration and revision of local laws and 
policies related to the institutional violation.
74
 Therefore, even an approach 
 
 
 69. Brown v. Bd. of Educ. (Brown I), 347 U.S. 483, 495 (1954). 
 70. Brown v. Bd. of Educ. of Topeka (Brown II), 349 U.S. 294, 300 (1955). 
 71. Id. 
 72. Id. at 300–01. 
 73. Owen M. Fiss, Foreword: The Forms of Justice, 93 HARV. L. REV. 1, 2–3 (1979). 
 74. See Brown II, 349 U.S. at 300–01 (“To that end, the courts may consider problems related to 
administration [of school districts]. They will also consider the adequacy of any plans the defendants 
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considered to represent a broad structural reform was limited to the 
administrative and institutional transgressions that constituted the 
constitutional violation. In fact, in subsequent decisions, courts have held 
that “Brown I did not require public schools to be racially integrated, but 
only prohibited school districts from engaging in intentional 
discrimination in the school admissions process.”75 The fact that Brown I 
did not offer any immediate relief shows the limited extent to which the 
decision took into account the actual and immediate experience of 
subordination among segregated students.
76
 Moreover, despite the 
“symbolic effect” that Brown I had “as a matter of phenomenology,” 
Brown II failed to even provide any specific relief order.
77
 
While in the two decades following Brown the U.S. Supreme Court’s 
remedial powers were seen as having provided the basis for some 
substantial integration of the schools and the proliferation of non-
discrimination provisions, those remedies were based on the removal of 
institutional barriers to discrimination.
78
 Moreover, critiques of the 
remedial jurisdiction are not based on claims that such interventions have 
resulted in a drastic reorientation of the remedial power or the reordering 
of a social structure that systematically reproduces constitutional 
violations, but rather on the basis of federal overreach and intervention in 
matters of local concern, overriding the autonomy of local institutions, and 
depriving them of decision-making authority.
79
 Linguistically, even broad 
remedial actions in the United States, such as those in Brown II, do not 
transform the discursive structure of remedial power inherent in the 
positivist model, as they rely on facially neutral terminology to achieve 
 
 
may propose to meet these problems and to effectuate a transition to a racially nondiscriminatory 
school system. During this period of transition, the courts will retain jurisdiction of these cases.”).  
 75. Reginald Oh, Race Jurisprudence and the Supreme Court: Where Do We Go From Here?: 
Discrimination and Distrust: A Critical Linguistic Analysis of the Discrimination Concept, 7 U. PA. J. 
CONST. L. 837, 853 (2005) (referring to Briggs v. Elliot, 132 F. Supp. 776 (E.D.S.C. 1955)). 
 76. Roy L. Brooks, Brown v. Board of Education Fifty Years Later: A Critical Race Theory 
Perspective, 47 HOW. L.J. 581, 601 (2004) (arguing that the remedies in Brown fail to take culture and 
value systems into account). 
 77. Robert L. Hayman, Jr. & Nancy Levit, The Constitutional Ghetto, WIS. L. REV. 627, 636–38 
(1993). 
 78. J. HARVIE WILKINSON III, FROM BROWN TO BAKKE: THE SUPREME COURT AND SCHOOL 
INTEGRATION: 1954–1978 66 (1981); Mark C. Rahdert, Obstacles and Wrong Turns on the Road from 
Brown: Milliken v. Bradley and the Quest for Racial Diversity in Education, 13 TEMP. POL. & CIV. 
RTS. L. REV. 785 (2004) (arguing that in the decades after Brown, “our society made substantial 
progress in eliminating from the law most overt forms of racial discrimination”). 
 79. See Yoo, supra note 18, at 1176 (citing the Court’s rationale in Lewis v. Casey, 516 U.S. 804 
(1996), which criticized the lower court for: (1) failing to defer to prison authorities in deciding how to 
guard prisoners; (2) enmeshing the judiciary in minute details of institutional design; and (3) failing to 
allow the state institutions an opportunity to participate in the decision-making process). 
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results. In fact, the Supreme Court shifted its rhetoric of integration in 
Brown I to one of “non-discrimination” in Brown II, precisely to “slow 
down the move toward actual integration of schools.”80 This linguist shift 
“allowed the [Supreme] Court to contend that racial segregation is 
unconstitutional because laws requiring and enforcing it were ‘activated 
by bias and prejudice, and thus for that reason alone . . . violat[ive of] the 
Constitution.’”81 Accordingly, the facially neutral remedy of non-
discrimination would be understood to have been achieved when whites 
and blacks were afforded an equal opportunity to attend the same school, 
regardless of broader social and cultural factors.
82
 Courts no longer needed 
“to consult the plaintiffs’ interests to define the scope of the violation, all 
they had to do was use the test the [Supreme] Court had established to 
identify the violation,” thus shifting the focus to the “question of what 
remedy was sufficient to cure the violation.”83 
By the early 1970s, the Burger Court began to pull back from broad 
remedies for discrimination. In Swann v. Mecklenburg, while the Court 
reaffirmed the constitutionality of broad remedial powers, they also held 
that remedies must be tailored to a specific constitutional violation.
84
 Thus, 
the Court in Swann “candidly acknowledges the interplay of educational 
and residential segregation, yet steers away from a more comprehensive 
resolution of the problem of racial segregation.”85 The modest erosion of 
remedial powers continued in San Antonio v. Rodriguez (1973).
86
 In that 
case, the Court ruled that the economic disparities in school funding in San 
Antonio, Texas did not amount to impermissible discrimination because 
“to the extent that the Texas system of school financing results in unequal 
expenditures between children who happen to reside in different districts, 
we cannot say that such disparities are the product of a system that is so 
irrational as to be invidiously discriminatory.”87 Even as San Antonio v. 
Rodriguez was a harbinger of limited equity jurisprudence in the future, 
the U.S. Supreme Court’s reasoning reflected a structuralist and positivist 
 
 
 80. Oh, supra note 75, at 843. 
 81. Id. at 850 (citing ALBERT P. BLAUSTEIN & CLARENCE CLYDE FERGUSON, JR., 
DESEGREGATION AND THE LAW: THE MEANING AND EFFECT OF THE SCHOOL SEGREGATION CASES 
150–53 (1957)). 
 82. Id. at 848–53 (arguing that the emphasis on the word “discrimination” for the subordination 
of African-Americans in Brown II changed the purpose of Brown I from integration to non-
discrimination, which allowed them to fashion a facially neutral positivist remedy). 
 83. Poser, supra note 63, at 343. 
 84. Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. 1, 16 (1971).  
 85. Hayman & Levit, supra note 77, at 640–41. 
 86. San Antonio Indep. School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 54–55 (1973). 
 87. Id. 
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epistemology that saw racial discrimination as an abstract problem to be 
understood in a vacuum, a perspective that failed to take the actual injuries 
of inequality into account. As Camille Walsh has noted, the case “was the 
outcome of legal discourse that did not engage with complex identities” 
and was specifically “rooted in the fallacious premise of equal protection 
jurisprudence that only one category of protection could exist at a time.”88 
The Court’s crucial retreat from equitable remedies accompanied its 
decision in Milliken v. Bradley (1974). The case concerned a suit alleging 
that segregation in Detroit schools was a result of “official policies” 
promulgated by Detroit Public School System officials.
89
 At trial, the 
District Court found that “governmental actions and inaction at all levels, 
federal, state and local, have combined, with those of private 
organizations, such as loaning institutions and real estate associations and 
brokerage firms, to establish and to maintain the pattern of residential 
segregation throughout the Detroit metropolitan area.”90 Having reached 
this conclusion, however, the District Court was presented with a 
conundrum: as a result, in part, of this residential segregation, by 1974 the 
vast majority of people within the Detroit Metropolitan Area were not 
white.
91
 Accordingly, the District Court required the Detroit Board of 
Education to submit desegregation plans that encompassed not only the 
Detroit city limits, but also the larger three-county metropolitan area. On 
appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed that “the only feasible desegregation 
plan involves the crossing of the boundary lines between the Detroit 
School District and adjacent or nearby school districts for the limited 
purpose of providing an effective desegregation plan.”92 
By a 5–4 decision the U.S. Supreme Court reversed, and, in so doing, 
moved away from the deference to district courts to decide equitable 
remedies in segregation cases. The Court argued, in language that reminds 
one of the criticism of Judge Scheindlin’s decisions in Ligon and Floyd, if 
such a sweeping remedy were to be implemented:  
[I]t is obvious from the scope of the inter-district remedy itself that 
absent a complete restructuring of the laws of Michigan relating to 
school districts the District Court will become first, a de facto 
 
 
 88. Camille Walsh, Erasing Race, Dismissing Class: San Antonio Independent School District v. 
Rodriguez, 21 BERKELEY LA RAZA L.J. 133, 134 (2011). 
 89. Milliken v. Bradley, 418 U.S. 717, 723 (1974).  
 90. Id. at 724. 
  91. Reynolds Farley, Population Trends and School Segregation in the Detroit Metropolitan 
Area, 21 WAYNE L. REV. 867, 870–71 (1974). 
 92. Milliken v. Bradley, 418 U.S. 717, 735 (1974). 
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“legislative authority” to resolve these complex questions, and then 
the “school superintendent” for the entire area. This is a task which 
few, if any, judges are qualified to perform and one which would 
deprive the people of control of schools through their elected 
representatives.
93
 
The decision went on to explain that the remedy was beyond the scope of 
the violation, violated principles of local autonomy in school control, and 
engaged in improper “racial balancing” rather than the appropriate goal of 
creating a “unitary” school system.94 When considering what caused this 
shift, part of the explanation was certainly political: only William O. 
Douglas remained on the court from the Brown decisions, and four of the 
justices who decided Milliken had been appointed by President Richard 
Nixon, who was perceived as an opponent of forced desegregation. Those 
four justices were considerably more conservative than those that they 
replaced.
95
 The Burger Court favored narrow, procedural, and formalist 
distinctions. Their adoption of the idea that remedies needed to be tailored 
to “violations”—a specific past act of discrimination—implies that the 
problem was not structural in nature but rather concrete and based on 
individual acts of derogation from social expectations. This interpretation 
means that the doctrinal response would never be sufficient to address a 
structural problem, but will be limited to correcting a specific wrong and 
nothing beyond that.
96
 The juridical approach of “tailoring” the remedy to 
a specific violation “stands equity jurisprudence upside down.”97 In 
essence, the Burger Court reversed the syntax of the relationship between 
remedy and right: rather than the courts being required to devise whatever 
remedy was necessary to secure a right, the Burger Court after Milliken 
saw equitable relief as doing only what was minimally necessary to 
remedy a violation.
98
  
The logical result of the rhetorical shift effectuated by the court in 
Milliken is the decision reached by the court in Missouri v. Jenkins (1995). 
The case evaluated a District Judge’s remedy to a long-standing school 
segregation dispute in the Kansas City area.
99
 While the United States 
 
 
 93. Id. at 743–44. 
 94. Rahdert, supra note 78, at 794. 
 95. Erwin Chemerinsky, Lost Opportunity: The Burger Court and the Failure to Achieve Equal 
Educational Opportunity, 45 MERCER L. REV. 999, 1008 (1994). 
 96. Id.  
 97. Rahdert, supra note 78, at 799. 
 98. Id. 
 99. Missouri v. Jenkins, 515 U.S. 70, 137–38 (1995).  
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District Court avoided the inter-district busing scheme rejected in 
Milliken, it did order a series of sweeping remedies, which resulted in a 
proposal to establish six magnet schools and conduct substantial and 
expensive capital improvements to schools as a means of attracting a 
diverse student body.
100
 In a 5–4 decision, the U.S. Supreme Court held 
that this remedy was too expansive, and that the District Court’s remedies 
are limited to “those which would remedy a constitutional violation—
nothing further.”101 Justice Thomas demonstrated that some on the court 
were willing to question the entire enterprise of equity jurisprudence. In 
his concurrence, he suggested that equitable powers were simply a means 
to “vest judges with the discretion to escape the constraints and dictates of 
the law.”102 Yet according to the four dissenters, to truncate equity powers 
in such a way would not only make it impossible for segregation remedies 
to be effective, but also would violate common sense.
103
 
The historical roots of this proceduralist approach to constitutional 
jurisprudence can be traced back to constitutional design. In fact, the 
constitutional framework in the United States has been concerned with 
establishing a baseline of procedural guarantees, regardless of whether 
those procedures provided direct improvement of a structural problem or 
the most useful outcome in connection with application or 
implementation. The United States Constitution was designed to facilitate 
the resolution of disputes that might otherwise be intractable by providing 
some common ground, i.e., some minimal procedure that was available to 
facilitate a basic solution.
104
 
Sometimes, in the familiar formulation, it is more important that things 
be settled than that they be settled right, and the provisions of the 
Constitution settle things. The Constitution tells us how long a President’s 
term will be, how many senators each state will have, whether there are to 
be jury trials in criminal cases, and many other things. Even if the rules the 
Constitution prescribes are not the best possible rules, they serve the very 
 
 
 100. Id. at 76–79. 
 101. Maloy, supra note 21, at 643; Poser, supra note 63, at 295 (“At the remedial stage of 
desegregation litigation, the primary judicial principle guiding the courts is that the relief ordered must 
remedy the constitutional violation.”). 
 102. Missouri v. Jenkins, 515 U.S. 70, 133 (1995); Maloy, supra note 21, at 644–45. 
 103. Missouri, 515 U.S. at 174 (Souter, J., dissenting) (“But there is no apparent reason to reverse 
that decision, which represented the judgment of a unanimous Court, seems to reflect equitable 
common sense, and has been in the reports for two decades.”). 
 104. Mark Tushnet, Common Law, Common Ground and Jefferson’s Principles, 112 YALE L.J. 
1717, 1719 (2003).  
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valuable function of providing an answer so that we do not have to keep 
reopening those issues all the time.
105
 
Accordingly, the goal of the United States Constitution is largely a 
functional one, focused heavily on procedural remedies that do not have to 
be revisited time and time again. While the Constitution specifically 
granted equitable powers to courts of law, there was considerable debate 
as to the extent and purpose of that power. While Federalists argued that it 
was necessary to empower the federal courts with equity jurisdiction, 
Anti-federalists were concerned with the impact on common law 
jurisprudence if a single court had the jurisdiction to decide both issues of 
law and equity. The fact that in the American context, the equitable power 
was merged within the province of an independent judiciary, and did not 
derive its power from any executive prerogative, as seen in the English 
tradition, indicates that the court’s equity power was meant to be tempered 
in accordance with what procedure dictates, the rule of law, and judicial 
restraint.
106
 The debate surrounding equitable remedies remains mired in 
these institutional dimensions, with a focus on the proper balance of power 
rather than the restructuring required to vindicate a perceived injustice. 
A. Expansive Remedies and the Supreme Court of India 
In India, the formulation of constitutional principles was in part a 
response to the inequities that existed during British rule in India. In the 
colonial context, Indian High Court decisions could only be appealed to 
the Privy Council in London because no parallel court existed in India.
107
 
The 1935 Government of India Act, which influenced the constitutional 
framework, established a new Federal Court in New Delhi.
108
 The 
Supreme Court of India was seen as taking on the jurisdiction of the Privy 
Council, which included discretionary appeals through special leave.
109
 In 
addition, the Supreme Court of India was given original jurisdiction to 
 
 
 105. Id. at 1719–20. See also Richard Albert, Constitutional Disuse or Desuetude: The Case of 
Article V, 94 B.U. L. REV. 1029, 1035–36 (2014) (noting the United States Constitution entrenches 
very challenging amendment rules that are only valid “when they adhere to the procedures detailed in 
the text of Article V” in order to create a document with some flexibility without the ease of 
changeability). 
 106. Poser, supra note 63, at 308. 
 107. Nick Robinson, Structure Matters: The Impact of Court Structure on the Indian and U.S. 
Supreme Courts, 61 AM. J. COMP. L. 173, 178 (2013). 
 108. Id. at 178. 
 109. Id. at 178–79. See also Sathe, supra note 27, at 36 (noting the Court struck down relatively 
few statutes during this period). 
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hear fundamental rights cases.
110
 The discourse surrounding the role of the 
new court involved notions of liberalizing jurisdiction that ensured that 
“the ordinary man gets full justice.”111 Moreover, in framing justiciable 
fundamental rights for the new Constitution, members of the Constituent 
Assembly of India consistently expressed concern that articulations of 
fundamental rights in other constitutions, such as that of the United States, 
were inconsistently enforced.
112
 As such, Section 32 of the Constitution of 
India guarantees “right to move the Supreme Court by appropriate 
proceedings for the enforcement” of fundamental rights, and original 
petitions for redress of violations of fundamental rights continue to be 
filed directly with the Supreme Court of India.
113
 
However, in the early years of the development of an independent 
Indian nation, the Indian courts proceeded cautiously. Even after the 1935 
Government of India Act, “the courts continued to both construe the 
legislative acts strictly and to apply the English common law methods for 
safeguarding individual liberties.”114 In 1950, the first year of the Supreme 
Court of India ’s existence, it deferred to the legislature in holding that the 
preventative detention of an individual who was not being accused of a 
crime violated neither Article 19’s guarantee of freedom of movement nor 
Article 22’s protection against unlawful detention.115 The “uncomfortably 
restrictive view of ‘personal liberty’” articulated in this case, A.K. 
Gopalan v. State of Madras (1950), was consistent with the Court’s desire 
to defer to the legislature, and was significant in that “it did not have to 
fulfill the tests of other fundamental rights.”116 Moreover, in the first 
decades of the Supreme Court of India’s existence, it consistently adopted 
 
 
 110. Robinson, supra note 107, at 179. 
 111. Id. 
 112. N.G. Ranga, Speech to the Constituent Assembly, January 20, 1947, CONSTITUENT 
ASSEMBLY DEBATES: PROCEEDINGS, Aug. 11, 2015, available at http://parliamentofindia.nic.in/ 
ls/debates/vol2p1.htm (“in framing that Constitution we will have to see that there is a charter of 
fundamental rights. We are agreed upon that, but that will not be enough. Several other countries also 
have had their charters of fundamental rights. Yet these fundamental rights have been neglected by 
their own governments.”); Sardar Vallabhbhai Patel, Interim Report of the Subcommittee on 
Fundamental Rights, April 28, 1947, CONSTITUENT ASSEMBLY DEBATES: PROCEEDINGS, Aug. 11, 
2015, available at http://parliamentofindia.nic.in/ls/debates/vol3p2.htm (“We are of the opinion that 
fundamental rights of the citizens of the Union would have no value if they differed from Group to 
Group or from Unit to Unit or are not uniformly enforceable.”). 
 113. INDIA CONST. art. 32. 
 114. Sathe, supra note 27, at 37. 
 115. A.K. Gopalan v. State of Madras, (1950) 1950 SCR 88 (India). 
 116. Vijayashri Sripati, Toward Fifty Years of Constitutionalism and Fundamental Rights in 
India: Looking Back to See Ahead (1950–2000), 14 AM. U. INT’L L. REV. 413, 439 (1998–1999). 
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a narrow view of property rights that protected elite landlords.
117
 Most 
significantly, it ruled Indira Gandhi’s declaration of emergency 
constitutional, despite its questionable legal justification and the fact that 
the declaration justified “flagrant violations of civil liberties by the 
Executive.”118  
But even in its decisions on property rights, the Supreme Court of India 
demonstrated its willingness to act decisively. In L.C. Golaknath v. State 
of Punjab (1967), the Supreme Court of India ruled that fundamental 
rights, as articulated in the Constitution, could not be removed or altered 
by amendment. In doing so, it “effectively declared a constitutional 
amendment unconstitutional.”119 The Court’s explanation for this decision 
reflected an epistemological view that an active judiciary was necessary to 
maintain rights meant to be reserved for the people: 
The Constitution has given a place of permanence to the 
fundamental freedoms. In giving to themselves the Constitution the 
people have reserved the fundamental freedoms to themselves. 
Article 13 merely incorporates that reservation. The Article is 
however not the source of the protection of fundamental rights but 
the expression of the reservation. The importance attached to the 
fundamental freedoms is so transcendental that a bill enacted by a 
unanimous vote of all the members of both Houses is ineffective to 
derogate from its guaranteed exercise. It is not what Parliament 
regards at a given moment as conducive to the public benefit but 
what Part III declares protected, which determines the ambit of the 
freedom. The incapacity of Parliament therefore in exercise of its 
amending power to modify, restrict, or impose fundamental 
freedoms in Part III arises from the scheme of the Constitution and 
the nature of the freedoms.
120
 
 
 
 117. Id. at 484. See also Jayanth K. Krishnan, Scholarly Discourses, Public Perceptions, and the 
Cementing of Norms: The Case of the Indian Supreme Court and a Plea for Research, 9 J. APP. PRAC. 
& PROCESS 255, 263, 266 (2007) (discussing decisions that zamindars required compensation for lands 
taken and upholding bank shareholder’s rights to property). 
 118. Sripati, supra note 116, at 440. See also John Ferejohn & Pasquale Pasquino, The Law of 
Exception: A Typology of Emergency Powers, 2 INT’L J. CONST. L. 210, 216, 232 (2004) (citing the 
Emergency as an abuse of power and an example of using emergency powers to defeat “legitimate 
competitors for office” rather than enemies). 
 119. Carl Baar, Social Action Litigation in India: The Operation and Limits of the World’s Most 
Active Judiciary, 19 POL’Y STUD. J. 140, 146 (1990).  
 120. I. C. Golaknath & Ors v. State of Punjab & Anrs., (1967) 1967 SCR 762 (India), available at 
http://indiankanoon.org/doc/120358/. 
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Though this decision was eventually modified in Kesavananda Bharati v. 
State of Kerala case in 1973, the Court continued to limit amendments to 
the Constitution to those that did not change the “basic structure” of 
rights.
121
 
Moreover, by the mid-1970s the Supreme Court of India, concerned 
over public perception of its complicity in allowing the abuses of the 
Emergency, moved much more definitely toward enforcing fundamental 
rights and encouraging public interest litigation.
122
 The Supreme Court of 
India’s epistemological approach to the adjudication of rights and the 
implementation of remedial measures begins with its broad interpretation 
of constitutional provisions. For example, the Supreme Court of India 
created a constitutional synthesis between the Directive Principles 
identified in the Indian Constitution, which largely pertained to non-
justiciable and generally non-binding social and economic rights, and the 
justiciable civil and political rights. In its interpretation of Article 21, the 
right to life was defined as “the right to life with dignity.”123 In the 
People’s Union for Civil Liberties v. Union of India and Others (PUCL, 
2003), the Court held that this right includes the right to food. Although 
the right to food would otherwise fall under a Directive Principle, the 
Court incorporates this right into Article 21, “thereby transforming it into 
a justiciable and enforceable fundamental right.”124  
In India, public interest litigation (“PIL”) or social action litigation, to 
which it is also referred, has been “repeatedly used to protect the interests 
of disadvantaged groups as well as address matters of public concern.”125 
Several key features of PIL have reoriented formal procedural rules in 
order to increase accessibility and remedial protections. Discussion during 
the Constituent Assembly debates often focused on the ability of the 
“masses to invoke the aid of the law as against the State, as against the 
Government and its incumbents from time to time in order to see that these 
 
 
 121. Baar, supra note 119, at 145. 
 122. Varun Gauri, Fundamental Rights and Public Interest Litigation in India: Overreaching or 
Underachieving?, 1 INDIAN J. OF L. & ECON. 71 (2009) (claiming that public interest litigation in India 
originated “in the late 1970s when the judiciary, aiming to recapture popular support after its 
complicity in Indira Gandhi’s declaration of emergency rule, encouraged litigation concerning the 
interests of the poor and marginalized, and to do so loosened rules and traditions related to standing, 
case filing, the adversarial process, and judicial remedies”). See also Sripati, supra note 116, at 441 
(noting that the Emergency catalyzed a “metamorphosis” of the court, which was henceforth no longer 
willing to defer to other branches in enforcing fundamental rights). 
 123. Lauren Birchfield & Jessica Corsi, Between Starvation and Globalization: Realizing the 
Right to Food in India, 31 MICH. J. INT’L L. 691, 709 (2010). 
 124. Id.  
 125. Konakuppakatil Gopinathan Balakrishnan, Singapore Academic of Law Annual Lecture 
2008: Growth of Public Interest Litigation in India, 21 SAcLJ 1 (2009). 
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fundamental rights are actually enforced.”126 The enumeration of 
constitutional remedies in the framing of the Indian Constitution was 
intended to allow any citizen to petition the Supreme Court of India for 
violations of fundamental rights guaranteed in the Indian Constitution.
127
 
The Supreme Court of India has made it clear that any member of the 
public who has sufficient interest, “even if not directly involved,” can seek 
judicial redress pursuant to Article 226 of the Indian Constitution.
128
 In 
one case in 1980, for example, the Supreme Court of India took epistolary 
jurisdiction over a journalist who had written an expose about prisoner 
abuse in Bihar after an attorney sent the court the article. The Supreme 
Court of India eventually ordered the State of Bihar to provide medical 
treatment for the detainees.
129
 By 1962, the Supreme Court of India had 
heard more than 3,800 cases brought by writ petitions on behalf of 
individuals who may not otherwise have had access to the court.
130
  
The success of social action litigation in India often requires the Court 
to circumvent formal legal procedures, including threshold requirements 
for standing and political questions.
131
 In diluting the requirements for 
locus standi, for example, the Court has allowed social activists and 
lawyers to bring cases on behalf of individuals who were unaware of their 
legal entitlements or unable to pursue an option of litigation due to cost. In 
addition, the Court established an epistolary jurisdiction in which it 
considered particular matters pertaining to fundamental rights violations 
through letters addressed to sitting judges.
132 
Moreover, the Court has 
reoriented the nature of the adversarial proceedings in order to ensure 
some lasting governmental accountability for systemic violations. In such 
proceedings, “the orientation of proceedings is usually more akin to 
 
 
 126. See Ranga, supra note 112. 
 127. Rohit De, Rebellion, Dacoity, and Equality: The Emergence of the Constitutional Field in 
Postcolonial India, 34 COMP. STUD. OF SOUTH ASIA, AFRICA & THE MIDDLE EAST 260, 265 (2014). 
 128. SUBHASH KASHYAP, OUR CONSTITUTION: AN INTRODUCTION TO INDIA’S CONSTITUTION 
AND CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 257 (5th ed. 2014). 
 129. Susan D. Susman, Distant Voices in the Courts of India: Transformation of Standing in 
Public Interest Litigation, 13 WIS. INT’L. L.J. 57, 58 (1994). 
 130. De, supra note 127, at 265. 
 131. Baar, supra note 119. However, it may be important to note that broad remedial protections 
come at the cost of finality. The Court often uses jurisdiction through interim orders and directives, 
which do not establish broader accountability for systemic violations. Ultimately, the cost of broad and 
progressive social reform may be the lack of sustainability and enforcement. Id. 
 132. Id. at 1–2; see also Upendra Baxi, Taking Suffering Seriously: Social Action Litigation in the 
Supreme Court of India, 4 THIRD WORLD LEGAL STUD. 107, 122 (1985), available at http://scholar. 
valpo.edu/twls/vol4/iss1/6 (noting the grants of epistolary jurisdiction, allowing individuals to directly 
petition the Supreme Court of India for redress through the venue of personal letters); Baar, supra note 
119, at 142 (noting the novelty of epistolary jurisdiction as a judicial procedure and describing how it 
leads to judges soliciting cases). 
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collective problem solving, rather than an acrimonious contest between 
counsels.”133 The Court regularly uses socio-legal means to assist in the 
adjudication of cases by among other things, appointing fact-finding 
commissions to conduct independent research on a particular subject 
matter and report back to the court. It also pushes the boundaries of 
constitutional remedies by establishing a process of “continuing 
mandamus,” which enables the Court to regularly issue directions and 
oversee and monitor the implementation of its directives by executive 
agencies.
134
 The Court has even taken over the direction of administration 
in particular arenas from the executive, with expenses borne by the state. 
By doing so, the Court undertakes “those very administrative decisions, 
which the state should have taken in the first place.”135 
In defense of the activist orientation of the Supreme Court, Chief 
Justice Konahuppakatil Gopinathan Balakrishnan explains: 
The main rationale for ‘judicial activism’ in India lies in the highly 
unequal social profile of our population, where judges must take 
proactive steps to protect the interests of those who do not have a 
voice in the political system and do not have the means or 
information to move the courts. This places the Indian courts in a 
very different social role as compared to several developed nations 
where directions given by ‘unelected judges’ are often viewed as 
unjustified restraints on the will of the majority. It is precisely this 
countermajoritarian function that needs to be robustly discharged by 
an independent and responsible Judiciary.
136
 
The historical context and the resulting structure of the Supreme Court lent 
themselves to the establishment of a Court with a “flexible, human rights 
 
 
 133. See Balakrishnan, supra note 125, at 2; see also Ashok Desai and S. Muralidhar, Public 
Interest Litigation: Potential and Problems, in SUPREME BUT NOT INFALLIBLE-ESSAYS IN HONOR OF 
THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA 159, 165 (2000) (“In PIL there are no winners or losers and the 
mindset of both lawyers and judges can be different from that in ordinary litigation. The Court, the 
parties and their lawyers are expected to participate in resolution of a given public problem.”).  
 134. See, e.g., Ashoka Kumar Thakur v. Union Of India And Ors, Writ Petition (civil) 265 of 
2006 (India) (in adjudicating the validity of the provision for reservations in educational institutions, 
the Court approved a twenty-seven percent ceiling conditioned upon a review of the quota every five 
years). 
 135. See Baxi, supra note 132, at 122. 
 136. Balakrishnan, supra note 125, at 4 (emphasis added); see also Kashyap, supra note 128, at 
258 (“In recent years, under what has come to be called judicial activism, the Supreme Court has 
issued directions to control pollution, to check the evil of child prostitution, to revive a sick company 
to protect the livelihood of 10,000 employees, to look into the danger to safety in building a dam, to 
segregate the children of prostitutes from their mothers, to provide insurance to workers in match 
factories, to protect the Taj Mahal from environmental pollution, etc.”). 
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oriented approach to constitutional interpretation.”137 The history of the 
Supreme Court of India comes out of a constitutional moment in which the 
Court was regarded as the guardian of a nationalist social revolution that 
was supposed to forge a single Indian people out of the variegated castes 
and cultures of the colonial state. Therefore, the principles incorporated 
into the Constitution account for the vulnerabilities of the average citizen 
who would likely not have substantial economic resources. The Directive 
Principles, which are non-binding guidelines for framing law and policy in 
India, delineate the need for substantial and progressive social change, and 
recommend a “temporary and modifiable” approach to improving social 
conditions.
138
 According to the Directive Principles, the provisions of the 
Constitution were “not erected as the barriers to progress.”139 Instead, the 
Court was charged with changing a country that embraced hierarchy into 
one that “internalized the liberal values of equality and freedom of 
expression for all its citizens.”140  
Moreover, the structure of the Court contributes to a revisionist 
approach to constitutional adjudication. The Supreme Court of India 
operates as a polyvocal court, in which separate panels of judges (usually 
no more than two or three) agree to take on and hear a case.
141
 Unlike the 
U.S. Supreme Court, the Supreme Court of India does not speak in a 
single voice. Any given bench may have a slightly different interpretation 
of a statutory provision, which in many ways increases the uncertainty of 
the precedential effect of any single panel decision.
142
 However, this also 
permits the Court to constantly revisit and reinterpret established laws. 
Judicial clusters can push precedent in new directions if judges seek to 
proactively shape jurisprudence.
143
 This reinterpretation of fundamental 
provisions in light of contemporary needs has enabled the Court to create a 
vast public interest litigation jurisprudence, which “would have been far 
less likely without the Court’s panel structure.”144  
 
 
 137. Birchfield & Corsi, supra note 123, at 710. 
 138. Id. at 711. 
 139. Chandra Bhavan Boarding and Lodging, Bangalore v. State of Mysore, (1970) 1970 SCR 
600, 601 (India). 
 140. Robinson, supra note 107, at 182. 
 141. Id. at 184. 
 142. Id. at 186. 
 143. Id. at 189. 
 144. Id. at 188. 
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IV. EXPANSIVE REMEDIAL PROTECTIONS AND THE BROAD INTERPRETIVE 
LENS 
One of the key features of Supreme Court of India jurisprudence since 
the 1970s is the issuance of broad remedial measures through the 
mechanism of public interest litigation to ensure governmental 
accountability and implementation of judicial directives.
145
 The Supreme 
Court of India, in utilizing a broad interpretative framework that connects 
the adjudication of law with lived experience, begins to craft expansive 
remedial measures that address systemic inequalities, including 
discrimination. The Court, in fact, has claimed that it must be given a 
larger participatory role in particular cases because it has a responsibility 
to step into the shoes of those perceived to be vulnerable, in order to put 
them “on a footing of equality with the rich in administration of justice.”146 
Moreover, broad remedial measures are needed for a violation of 
fundamental rights because the purpose of public law is not only to 
“civilize public” power but also to ensure citizens that their rights will be 
protected from arbitrary and capricious actions.
147
  
The Court refers to its constitutional grant of authority in granting 
broad remedial powers, not to correct a procedural error, but to correct a 
social injustice.
148
 Rather than serving as a protector of the judicial system, 
the court sees itself as doing what is necessary to prevent vulnerability:  
The Court stated that Article 32 of the Constitution of India, 
does not merely confer power on this Court to issue a direction, 
order or writ for enforcement of the fundamental rights but also lays 
down a constitutional obligation on this Court to protect the 
fundamental rights of the people and for that purpose this Court has 
all incidental and ancillary powers including the power to forge new 
remedies and fashion new strategies designed to enforce the 
 
 
 145. Burt Neuborne, The Supreme Court of India, 1 INT’L J. CONST. L. 476, 503 (2003) 
(explaining how, in the wake of Emergency in the 1970s, “the Court dramatically expanded its 
remedial powers, often taking operational control of failing government institutions and requiring 
systematic efforts to mitigate the effects of past injustices”); see also Sathe, supra note 27, at 67–68 
(noting that the Supreme Court of India relies on the precedent of broad use of English writs to extend 
its judgments beyond the remedies requested by a petitioner, which allows them to “mold relief to 
meet the particular requirements of this country”). 
 146. Ashok Desai & S. Muralidhar, supra note 133, at 159, 160. 
 147. Shri D.K. Basu v. State of West Bengal, 1 S.C.R. 416 (1996); see also Sam F. Halabi, 
Constitutional Borrowing as Jurisprudential and Political Doctrine in Shri D.K. Basu v. State of West 
Bengal, 3 NOTRE DAME J. INT’L & COMP. L. 73, 104 (2013) (emphasizing that D.K. Basu v. State of 
West Bengal emphasized the structural ability of courts to ensure the fundamental rights of citizens). 
 148. M.C. Mehta v. Union of India, 1 S.C.R. 395, 405 (1987).  
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fundamental rights. It is in realization of this constitutional 
obligation that this Court has in the past innovated new methods and 
strategies for the purpose of securing enforcement of the 
fundamental rights, particularly in the case of the poor and 
disadvantaged who are denied their basic human rights and to 
whom freedom and liberty have no meaning.
149
  
The Court’s willingness to craft extensive remedies based on broad 
readings of constitutional provisions is perhaps best expressed in Maneka 
Gandhi v. Union of India (1978). Maneka Gandhi, married to the son of 
Prime Minister Indira Gandhi and grandson of Prime Minister Jawaharlal 
Nehru, challenged a decision by the Government of India to revoke her 
passport in July 1977. Three months prior an election drove her husband 
and Indira Gandhi out of their seats in Parliament and ushered in a 
majority for the Janata Party led by Morarji Desai.
150
 While the remedy of 
ordering the government to return the passport may be modest, the 
language of the decision is indicative of the integrative and synergistic 
view that the Court has constructed on constitutional rights and remedies. 
In particular, the Court argued that, rather than separately examining 
violations of Article 19, protecting freedom of speech, and Article 21, 
protecting personal liberty, where perhaps no violations of any individual 
provision can be established, constitutional provisions should be read 
together as a fluid whole. Violations that combined aspects of each, as in 
denying someone the right to travel and express themselves 
internationally, may still constitute a constitutional violation. Thus, they 
could not be viewed as “watertight compartments” hermetically sealed 
from one another.
151
 Integrating rights as part of an essential, indivisible 
whole is necessary to implement the very purpose of the constitution, as 
they are: 
[A]ll parts of an integrated scheme in the Constitution. Their waters 
must mix to constitute that grand flow unimpeded and impartial 
justice (social, economic and political), freedom (not only of 
thought, expression, belief, faith and worship, but also of 
association, movement vocation or occupation as well as of 
acquisition and possession of reasonable property), or equality (of 
status and of opportunity, which imply absence of unreasonable or 
unfair discrimination between individuals, groups and classes), and 
 
 
 149. Id. 
 150. PRANAY GUPTE, MOTHER INDIA: A POLITICAL BIOGRAPHY OF INDIRA GANDHI 448 (2012). 
 151. Maneka Gandhi v. Union of India, 1978 AIR 597, 623. 
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of fraternity (assuring dignity of the individual and the unity of the 
nation) which our Constitution visualizes. Isolation of various 
aspects of human freedom, for purposes of their protection, is 
neither realistic nor beneficial but would defeat very objects of such 
protection.
152
  
Moreover, in implementing constitutional rights as a fundamental whole, 
remedies had to be crafted that were sensitive to the needs of individuals 
and represented practical solutions rather than appeals to abstract 
formalism. “The tests of reason and justice cannot be abstract,” Chief 
Justice Mirza Hameedullah Beg explained, because they would in that 
case be “divorced from the needs of the nation.”
153
 The Maneka Gandhi 
case was therefore significant not only for its political importance but for 
its robust assertion of the interconnectedness of constitutional rights and of 
concrete procedures for their implementation.
154
  
These concerns were raised again most poignantly in the case of 
People’s Union for Civil Liberties v. Union of India. The case was 
submitted by a civil liberties league as Public Interest Litigation, a 
category of litigation created through Article 32 of the Constitution of 
India, which states that “the right to move the Supreme Court by 
appropriate proceedings for the enforcement” of any of the fundamental 
rights delineated by the Constitution “is guaranteed.”155 The right at issue 
in this case was a constitutional right to food. This right was derived from 
Article 21, which guarantees that “no person shall be deprived of his life 
or personal liberty except according to procedure established by law.”156 In 
Francis Coralie Mullin v. Administrator (1981), the Supreme Court of 
India had reasoned that: 
Every limb or faculty through which life is enjoyed is thus protected 
by Article 21 and a fortiorari, this would include the faculties of 
thinking and feeling. Now deprivation which is inhibited by Article 
may be total or partially neither any limb or faculty can be totally 
destroyed nor can it be partially damaged. Moreover it is every kind 
of deprivation that is hit by Article 21, whether such deprivation be 
permanent or temporary and, furthermore, deprivation is not an act 
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which is complete once and for all: it is a continuing act and so long 
as it lasts, it must be in accordance with procedure established by 
law. Therefore any act which damages or injures or interferes with 
the use of any limb or faculty of a person either permanently or 
even temporarily, would be within the inhibition of Article 21.
157
 
Reasoning that an inability to eat constitutes a “deprivation of life and 
limb,” the PUCL argued that the failure of certain promised government 
schemes to feed the poor in Rajasthan constituted a violation of Article 21 
when interpreted in light of Article 47 of the non-justiciable “Directed 
Principles of State Policy,” which directs the state to regard raising the 
level of nutrition as among its “primary duties.”158 The court agreed and 
ordered a broad remedy vastly increasing payments by the Government of 
India to food programs, setting out a minimum provision of grains and 
nutritious food and the implementation of specific procedures for food 
distribution.
159
  
In Kesavananda Bharati v. State of Kerala, the Court held that the 
interlocking of procedural fundamental rights and the non-justiciable 
socio-economic Directive Principles were necessary as the two provisions 
were always meant to supplement one another. Both provisions aim at the 
same goal of “bringing about a social revolution and the establishment of a 
social welfare state.”160 In doing so, the Court reoriented the concept of 
justiciable rights enumerated in the Constitution for the express purpose of 
addressing a social problem that would otherwise fail to constitute a 
cognizable remedy under traditional conceptions of justiciability. For 
example, the Court goes on to recognize a right to livelihood and housing 
for pavement dwellers being displaced due to commercial construction 
projects and the right to health in the provision of immediate medical 
assistance when needed in emergency cases.
161
 
Finally, in Municipal Council of Ratlam v. Varichand, the Supreme 
Court recognized as valid the standing of a group of citizens who were 
subjected to the health and environmental impacts of an open drain, which 
caused both harsh odor and disease.
162
 The Court argued that certain rights 
may pertain to groups of citizens rather than merely to individuals. They 
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cited the Constitution’s Preamble as providing the foundation for the 
legitimation of a shift from “the traditional individualism of locus standi to 
the community orientation of public interest litigation.” In doing so, they 
recognize that when formal procedural rules fail to adequately remedy the 
issues that face “ordinary men,” it is the Court’s role, with authority 
claimed from the Constitution itself, to step in to fill this socio-legal 
vacuum by changing the nature and structure of the juridical rules 
themselves. 
The Supreme Court of India’s aggressiveness rests on a tradition of 
extensive judicial equitable remedies for constitutional violations in Indian 
jurisprudence. They were willing to create justiciability, otherwise lacking 
pursuant to prevailing interpretations of constitutional remedies. They 
were even willing to specify costly and substantive actions in compelling 
the government to act, i.e., to give substantial food aid to a wide portion of 
the population, and its willingness to reorient procedural threshold 
requirements.
163
 It also speaks to the court’s recognition that in cases of 
“entrenched institutional behavior,” which violate fundamental rights, 
broad relief is necessary “to bring the behavior of an institution in line 
with constitutional and statutory requirements.”164 Despite the court’s 
deferrals to other branches of government in the 1950s and 1960s in its 
narrow interpretation of constitutional principles, the tradition of allowing 
for broad remedies is often traced to the drafting of the Constitution. At 
that time, members of the Constituent Assembly worked to guarantee 
greater social and economic rights than were granted in previous versions 
of Indian constitutional schemes and agitated for a constitution in which 
“social and economic rights” would “play a prominent part.”165 India was, 
after all, “ultimately established as a social welfare state,” and therefore 
the Indian Constitution provides for “comparatively easy incorporation of 
human rights principles into Indian Constitutional Law.”166 Reflecting on 
the socio-legal tradition of the Supreme Court of India, Justice 
Balakrishnan noted that while “the device of PIL may have its detractors, 
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it has played an invaluable role in advancing our constitutional philosophy 
of social transformation and improving access to justice.”167 
Needless to say, the Supreme Court of India’s recognition of the need 
for broad remedies and the Court’s willingness to grant such broad relief 
in cases from food aid to the right to travel does not imply that the 
Government of India is able to provide such equitable relief in an efficient 
manner. Indeed, the disconnect between the articulation of rights in the 
Indian Constitution and by the Courts and the actual application of those 
rights—or lack thereof—by lower courts, police, and local government is 
profound. It is unclear whether local populations fully comprehend the 
rights that are available to them, particularly when so much of government 
business in India is conducted in either English and Hindi, neither of 
which are the mother tongue of the majority of Indians.
168
 Yet it is 
noticeable that, in a country whose political and constitutional culture 
supports the broad understanding of social justice and economic and social 
rights, broad and equitable remedies are applied by the courts without the 
same level of interpretive consternation that is prevalent in the post-1970s 
constitutional jurisprudence of courts in the United States. 
CONCLUSION 
This article has shown that comparing equity jurisprudence should 
involve more than just a discussion of the structural and functional 
differences in law and interpretation. Instead, it argues that such 
comparisons should involve analyzing particular historical and cultural 
circumstances during which shifts in the interpretation of equity 
jurisprudence arise, which gives rise to an appreciation, in a comparative 
context, of how judicial interpretation changes over time. Even more 
importantly, such comparisons must analyze differences in the nature and 
purpose of constitutional jurisprudence. These epistemological differences 
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can reveal divergent cultural assumptions about the nature and purpose of 
law that, in turn, reflect the different social circumstances in which 
equitable remedies are deployed. The epistemological limitations of the 
positivist model are rooted in the history and purpose of legal 
jurisprudence. In order to truly understand the scope of constitutional 
approaches taken in different contexts, it is important to understand the 
historic and political circumstances in which they arise.
169
  
Since the 1950s, the jurisprudence of equitable remedies moved in 
opposite directions in the United States and India. In the United States, the 
broad remedial powers needed to enforce desegregation decisions led to a 
widening of the scope of remedial actions. Starting in the 1970s, however, 
reactions against these broad remedial powers reversed the trend and led to 
a narrowing of the use of equity power that has continued to the present. 
The narrowing of federal equity jurisprudence based on a positivist and 
formalist understanding of the purpose of legal remedies, as well as a 
restrictive reading of the scope of the Article III remedial power centering 
on the alleviation of a procedural error, has shifted the conversation 
regarding rights violations away from the needs of a given social group at 
any particular moment in history and entangles the court and the public 
with formal “side-issues about precedent, texts, and interpretation.”170 In 
India, very different historical circumstances led to the opposite trajectory. 
In the 1950s, the courts were hesitant to use their broad equity powers, 
choosing instead to give deference to parliamentary interpretations and to 
legislative actions to enforce fundamental rights. By the 1970s, however, 
the widespread perception of the abuse of Constitutional powers by the 
legislature during the Emergency of 1975–77 gave rise to a much bolder 
use of equity power through the mechanism of Public Interest Litigation to 
provide the social reforms that were envisioned by the Constituent 
Assembly and outlined in the Constitution. 
The varying approaches taken by the Courts serve to highlight 
differences in epistemological assumptions of the nature and purpose of 
law. While the framers of the United States Constitution focused on 
procedural equity as a response to arbitrary and tyrannical exploitation of 
political power, the Constituent Assembly intended for the Supreme Court 
to have broad remedial power in addressing the experience of inequality 
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felt by vulnerable communities under the British Raj, despite the fact that 
there was some facially neutral and generally applicable procedure in 
place to address violations of the law. This difference in epistemology, 
coupled with the narrowing of equity jurisprudence in the United States 
over time, explains why Judge Sheindlin’s decision in the Floyd case, 
which would not have been at all unusual if it had been decided in the 
context of Indian constitutional jurisprudence, caused such controversy in 
a U.S. context. This epistemological distinction changes the fundamental 
scope and purpose of legal remedies. As Chief Justice Chandrachud 
articulated, the Indian Constitution “is not intended to be the arena of legal 
quibbling” based on abstract legal specialists, rather “it is made for the 
common people” and should be generally construed so that they can 
understand and appreciate it.
171
 More importantly, its “moral authority” 
comes from shifting the focus of judicial review from a narrow, doctrinal 
approach to social welfare to “the humanitarian concept of the protection 
of the weaker section of the people.”172 Ultimately, the discursive 
framework of constitutional discourse helps shape the nature, function and 
purpose of legal remedies.  
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